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Gary Hall 
We Can Know It for You: The Secret Life of Metadata 
Thirty years ago, the philosopher Jean-François Lyotard argued that science, lacking the 
resources to legitimate itself as true, had come to rely for its legitimacy on precisely the kind 
of knowledge it did not even consider to be knowledge: namely, non-scientific narrative 
knowledge. Specifically, it was philosophy’s role to produce a discourse of legitimation for 
science in the form of narratives such as those of the Enlightenment, progress, modernity and 
the creation of wealth. Lyotard’s intention was not to position philosophy as ultimately being 
able to tell us more about science than science itself, but to emphasize that, in a process of 
transformation which had been taking place since at least the end of the 1950s, such long-
standing metanarratives had become obsolete.  
 
So what does science do if the narratives that legitimate it are no longer credible? Lyotard’s 
answer was that science increases its connection to society by optimizing the relationship 
‘between input and output’. For Lyotard, writing in 1979, technological transformations in 
research and the transmission of knowledge, including the widespread use of computers and 
databases, were already in the process of exteriorizing knowledge in relation to the ‘knower’. 
Lyotard saw this as producing a major alteration in the status and nature of knowledge: away 
from questions of what is just, right and scientifically true, and toward a concern merely with 
‘optimizing the system’s performance’.1
 
  
Scroll down thirty years and we do indeed find many discourses in the sciences today being 
taken up with exteriorizing knowledge and information in order to maximise the system’s 
performance by eliminating delays and inefficiencies, and solving technical problems. 
Witness those studies arguing that the ‘open access’ academic publishing model championed 
by the sciences, whereby peer-reviewed scholarly research is made available online for free, 
is actually the most cost-effective mechanism for scholarly publishing. Indeed, there is a 
rapidly expanding body of literature detailing the various increases ‘open access’ makes 
possible in the amount of research material that can be published, searched and stored, the 
number of people who can access it, the impact of that material and the range of its 
distribution. Even the data created in the course of scientific research is being made openly 
available for others to use, analyse and build upon. Known as Open Data, this initiative is 
presented as bestowing data with a ‘vastly increased utility’: openly published digital datasets 
are ‘easily passed around’; they are ‘more easily reused’; and they contain more 
‘opportunities for educational and commercial exploitation’.2
 
  
Yet this alteration in the status and nature of knowledge is not confined to science - or even 
the academy. The current global financial crisis has only served to add greater emphasis to 
the belief of many in the UK that the government should relinquish its copyright on data 
gathered with taxpayers’ money – most notoriously that relating to MPs expenses – and make 
it openly available to the public online. From a liberal perspective, freeing government 
funded and collected data helps society perform more efficiently by leading to an increase in 
citizen participation in democracy, as access to information is no longer restricted either to 
the state or to those corporations, organizations and individuals who have sufficient money 
and power to acquire it for themselves. But neoliberals likewise perceive making the data 
freely and openly available to the public as a means of getting more out of the system for 
less. From this viewpoint such communicative transparency is held as ensuring greater value 
for money, enabling costs to be distributed more effectively, reducing bureaucracy and 
paperwork while also increasing choice, innovation, enterprise, creativity and competiveness.  
In fact, to have participated in the shift away from questions of what is just and right, and 
toward a concern merely with optimizing the relation between input and output, you don’t 
need to have actively contributed to the movements for ‘open access’ or free data at all. If 
you are one of the 1.3 million plus people who have purchased a Kindle e-book reader, then 
you’ve already signed a license agreement allowing Amazon - but not academic researchers 
or the public - to collect, store, mine, analyse and extract economic value from data 
concerning your personal reading habits for free. Similarly, if you are one of the 23 million in 
the UK and 350 million worldwide who use Facebook, then you’re already labouring for free, 
not only to help the owners of this social network make a reputed $1 billion a year from 
demographically targeted advertising, but to supply law enforcement agencies with profile 
data about yourself, your family, friends and colleagues they can use in investigations.3
 
 Even 
if you have done neither, you will in all probability have provided Google with a host of free 
data it can both monetize and give to the police as a result of having mapped your home, 
digitized your book, or supplied you with free music videos via Google Street View, Google 
Book Search and YouTube, which Google also owns.  
Obviously, you don’t have to buy that e-book reader, join that social network, or display your 
personal metrics online, from sexual activity to food consumption, in an effort to identify 
patterns in your life – what’s called life-tracking. Nevertheless, for most people, refusing to 
take part in this transformation of knowledge and information into quantities of data is not 
really an option. As Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari pointed out some time ago, ‘surplus 
labor no longer requires labor... one may furnish surplus-value without doing any work’.4 
Besides, such notions of refusal and resistance have their basis in a conception of the 
autonomous, rational, self-identical humanist subject that these developments in digital media 
culture and technology may be in the process of reconfiguring. As a result, they risk 
overlooking the manner in which computers, databases, archives, servers, blogs, microblogs, 
RSS feeds, image and video-sharing, social networking and ‘the cloud’ are not just being 
used to change the status and nature of knowledge; they may be involved in the constitution 
of a new form of human subject.5
 
  
Indeed, could the move toward supplying ever more research, information and data online for 
free be part of the development of what Deleuze dubbed a society of control? Here we are no 
longer subject primarily to those closed, disciplinary modes of power Michel Foucault 
described in books such as Discipline and Punish. Increases in computer processing capacity 
and the associated availability of large data sets have instead enabled a degree of data mining 
and pattern recognition to be achieved that makes it possible to automatically anticipate and 
predict – and thus control, albeit in a relativelyopen way – actions on the part of the subject 
before they actually take place. Think of the way Google News aggregates ‘headlines from 
news sources worldwide, groups similar stories together and displays them according to each 
reader's personalized interests’.6
 
 
From this perspective it’s crucial to study such technology platforms, media tools and spaces, 
and to understand how they work and are used. But it’s also crucial to investigate, analyze 
and interrogate them critically. It’s important, for example, to be aware that just ‘three 
companies - Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft - handle 95 percent of all search queries’; that 
‘for searches containing the name of a specific political organisation, Yahoo! and Google 
agree on the top result 90 percent of the time’;7
 
 and that conventional search engines actually 
reach only a tiny fraction of the total number of available web pages.  
So it’s not enough to simply ‘Free Our Data’,8
 
 or to operate on the basis that ‘information 
wants to be free’. We can put more and more research and data online, we can make it 
available under open access and open data conditions, we can even integrate, index and link it 
using the appropriate metadata to enable it to be searched and harvested with relative ease - 
but none of this means it’s going to be found. Ideas of this kind ignore the fact that all 
information and data is ordered, structured, selected and framed. This is what metadata is for, 
after all. Metadata is data about data. It’s information or data that describes, links to, or is 
otherwise used to control, order, structure, find, sort, select, filter, access, classify and present 
other data. One example would be the information provided at the front of a book detailing its 
publisher, date and place of publication, ISBN number and so on. However, the term is most 
commonly associated with the language of computing. There, metadata is what enables computers to access files and documents, not just in their own hard-drives, but potentially across a range of different platforms, servers, websites and databases. Yet for all its associations with computer science, metadata is never neutral or objective. The 
specific ways in which metadata is created, organized and presented helps to produce (rather 
than merely passively reflect) what is classified as data and information—and what is not.  
Clearly, then, it’s not just a question of free and open access to the research and data. It’s also 
a question of who (and what) makes decisions regarding the metadata, and on what basis such 
decisions are made. To paraphrase Lyotard, ‘Who decides what metadata is, and who knows 
what needs to be decided?’ Will the ‘ruling class’ – ‘corporate leaders, high-level 
administrators’ and so on – continue to be ‘the class of decision makers’ with regard to 
having ‘access to the information these machines have in storage’, but also in terms of 
creating and controlling the metadata?9
 
 Or does the fact these social relations are the result 
not of objective and immutable historical, scientific or technological processes, but of 
contingent, pragmatic yet temporary decisions involving power, conflict and violence, mean 
that they can be disarticulated and transformed, and that new sets of social relations can be 
established?  
To this end, is it possible to generate a plurality of different, and at times conflicting and even 
incommensurable possibilities for the creation, organization, presentation and control of data 
and metadata? Rather than just opening the already existing ‘memory and databanks’ to the 
people – the line Lyotard suggested we follow – could there not in the future also be a 
multitude of online, open, ‘counter-institutional’ platforms, tools, databases and other media 
experiments capable of maintaining a much needed level of opacity, noise, error, feedback, 
delay, antagonism and dissensus within the system?  
 
Is this exhibition ‘How We Became Metadata’ a move in that direction? 
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